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Abstract
This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict
end game eﬀects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis
yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on
subjects’ beliefs and let us conclude that, ﬁrst, the weight of the signal
is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second,
priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end
game eﬀects and they do very little updating of beliefs.
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1M o t i v a t i o n
Previous experimental research on public goods games has shown that in
one-shot games contributions are relatively high (40%-60% of endowment)
while in ﬁnitely repeated public good games contributions fall over time (see
Davis and Holt, 1993; Isaac, McCue and Plott, 1985; Kim and Walker, 1984;
Ledyard, 1995). Deviations from the free-riding zero contribution outcome
and the decline over time have been rationalized through social preferences,
learning eﬀects, strategic considerations or conditional cooperation.1
C o o p e r a t i o nm a ys u r v i v ei na ni n ﬁnitely repeated game, but even in a
ﬁnite game if there is a small probability that some subjects are not fully
rational, rational subjects may react by contributing in the early periods
and stop contributing toward the end of the game (see Kreps et al., 1982).
Players may not want to trigger a break in cooperation when the others are
1See Andreoni (1988, 1995), Houser and Kurzban (2002), Chaudhuri and Paichayontvi-
jit (2006), Ma, Sherstyuk, Dowling and Hill (2002), Keser and Winden (2000), Brandts and
Schram (2001), Oﬀerman, Sonnemans and Schram (1996) and Janssen and Ahn (2006),
among others.
2contributing but of course, this argument is no longer valid as the end of
the game approaches and, in particular, lowering the contribution in the last
period cannot trigger any retaliation. This argument can be extended. If
players were aware that lowering contributions in the last period will not
bring any consequence and they thought others were aware too, they might
also realize that lowering contributions in the previous to last period could
not trigger any retaliation either. This unraveling would make the ﬁnite
game equivalent to a one-shot game but it requires common knowledge of
rationality. The question is then whether subjects do indeed solve the game
by backwards induction. There is some evidence that subjects ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to apply this type of reasoning. Palacios and Volij, 2008, ﬁnd that agents used
to the backwards induction arguments (chess players) use it when playing the
centipede game, while subjects more unfamiliar with it (students) did not
use it to the same extent. Binmore, 1997 argues that rationality not always
implies the use of backward induction. Using backwards induction seems
to require some learning. In the usual laboratory experiment repetitions
of the PGG will not provide that learning since subjects face the end of
the game only once. Johnson, Camerer, Sen and Rymon, 2002, has shown
that subjects taught to use backward induction made equilibrium oﬀers in
3an alternative oﬀer bargaining game when playing with robots; however,
when they played with untrained subjects they behaved diﬀerently, although
closer to the equilibrium oﬀers than before training. They conclude that
both social preferences and a limited use of backward induction plays a role
in the discrepancy between the experimental outcome and the equilibrium
prediction.
Problems with backwards induction are not the only cognitive diﬃculties
faced by players. Understanding the incentives in the one-shot game may also
be an issue. Most papers have focused on this last type of limited cognition
and how learning through repetitions of the one-shot PGG mitigate its eﬀects
(see Anderson et al, 1998; Andreoni, 1988, 1995; Brandts and Schram, 2001;
Goeree et al, 2002; Houser and Kurzban, 2002; Palfrey and Prisbey, 1996,
1997). However, little attention has been paid to another source of cognitive
l i m i t a t i o ni nP G G :t h ef a c tt h a ts u b j e c t sa r en o tu s e dt oa p p l yb a c k w a r d
induction arguments in ﬁnite games nor do they believe that other subjects
will use this type of reasoning. To analyze this problem, we focus on the end-
game eﬀect2 in PGG and subjects’ beliefs on this eﬀect.3 Our work conﬁrms
2Several papers have dealt with the question of end-game eﬀects. Gonzalez et al. (2005)
ﬁnd that replacing a deﬁnite endpoint with an interval -commonly or privately known- does
not change the timing of defection nor the average contribution levels.
3Several papers explore beliefs —and elicitation mechanisms— in PGG (see for instance
4the diﬃculties related to backwards induction arguments in ﬁnite PGG.
Our main result indicates that a majority of subjects do not predict any
end game eﬀect at all, even when beliefs are elicited after playing the game.
We model ex-post beliefs as a linear combination of prior beliefs and the
signals observed during the game. In this set up, we ﬁnd that the signal
has a low weight in the determination of ex-post beliefs and, even though
subjects experienced an end-game eﬀect, this eﬀect is absent from their ex-
post beliefs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
experimental design and procedures. Section 3 presents our main results on
average behavior and beliefs. In Section 4 we analyze individual behavior.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
The experiment was carried out in a single session at Universidad de Granada
on May 31th, 2007. Participants were ﬁrst year undergraduate students in
Economics. The total number of participants was 48 divided in 12 groups.
Gätcher and Renner 2006, Dufwenberg et al. 2006, Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. 2007, Kovarik
2008).
5Students were told that they would perform several tasks.
For the ﬁrst task, subjects played a linear public good game (PGG) in each
group for ﬁve periods. Subjects were informed that they would be playing
w i t ht h es a m ep a r t n e r sf o rt h eﬁve periods. Each period subjects were given
an endowment of 100 coins of 2 euro cents each. They were asked to make
the decision on how much to allocate to a private account and how much
to allocate to a public account. Contributions were expressed in number of
coins, thus, they were integer numbers between 0 and 100, cit ∈ [0,100].
Participants were informed that any money allocated to the private account
they could keep for themselves, and this independently of other subjects’s
actions, while all the money allocated to the public account (the sum of the
money allocated by the four members of the group) would be multiplied by
1.5 a n dt h e ni tw o u l db ed i v i d e de q u a l l ya m o n gt h ef o u rm e m b e r s . E a c h
participant earned the sum of payoﬀs obtained in the ﬁve periods.
After each period each subject received privately feedback in terms of
his own payoﬀ, πit. Before the new period started they were given a new
endowment of 100 coins of 2 euro cents. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of
the experiment.
After making decisions on contributions to the public account for 5 peri-
6ods, and getting feedback of their payoﬀs, subjects started Task 2.
Figure 1: Timing
c1 c 3  c2 c 4 c 5 
π1  π 2  π 3  π 4  π 5 
(g1,g 2,g3,g4,g5) 
Task 1 Task 2
In Task 2, they were asked about their beliefs on the average contribution
to the public accounts (in number of coins) of the 48 participants and for
each of the ﬁve periods (git). We used an incentive scheme according to their
errors, eit = git − e ct (being e ct the observed average and t =1 ,...,5). More
precisely,
-I f5 < |eit| ≤ 10 participant i received 1 euro;
-I f0 < |eit| ≤ 5 participant i received 2 euros;
-I f|eit| > 10 participant i did not receive anything;
- Finally, if eit =0participant i would receive 20 euros.
Participants were told that only one of the periods chosen at random
would determine their payoﬀ for Task 2.
7Belief elicitation was placed after Task 1 to avoid any possible eﬀects on
contributions.4 T h ef a c tt h a tt h e yh a do b s e r v e dt h e i ro w np a y o ﬀs could only
increase belief accuracy. Since our main interest was to determine whether
subjects could predict any end game eﬀects and how they would react, we
chose a design with a low number of periods. Subjects had enough time to
think what they would do; after each decision a few minutes were left, then
the feedback about payoﬀs was received and then the following period would
start. The complete experiment lasted about an hour and subjects earned,
on average, 13.47.
3 Average Behavior
First we compare actions and elicited beliefs. We check whether subjects,
who had played the PGG for ﬁve periods and had received feedback about
their own payoﬀ after each one of them, could accurately predict the mean
contribution of the population and to what extent they could predict any
end-game eﬀects. Since beliefs were elicited in Task 2, they will be called
posterior beliefs.
4The evidence on whether belief elicitation may aﬀect contribution is mixed. See for
example Gächter and Renner (2006).
8Figure 2 shows both the average posterior beliefs (over the whole popu-
lation) and average actions in each period in the 4—player public good game.












round 1 round 2 round 3 round 4 round 5
CONTRIBUTIONS BELIEFS
A si su s u a li nt h i sl i t e r a t u r ew es e et h a tt h e r ei sad e c l i n ei nt h ea v e r a g e
contribution over time. In sharp contrast, the declining trend for guesses is
almost inexistent. To explore diﬀerences between actions and beliefs in period
t we deﬁne the discrepancy between them as dt, dt = ct − gt, (t =1 ,2,...,5).
Table 1 shows the relevant statistics for dt.
9Table 1: Beliefs Accuracy
mean median st. dev.
d1 4.02 -1.50 33.83
d2 0.97 -2.50 32.05
d3 0.81 -5.00 36.57
d4 -13.04 -12.50 23.36
d5 -9.37 -16.00 28.20
For the ﬁrst three periods the diﬀerence between actions and beliefs is
relatively small. However, the diﬀerence increases in periods 4 and 5.5 Hence
subjects’ beliefs matched actions fairly well for the ﬁrst three rounds but
f a i l e dt od os oi nT and T −1.I np e r i o d4 ,w h e nt h ee n dg a m ee ﬀect is ﬁrst
observed, the diﬀerence between the two is statistically signiﬁcant.
We check whether there is a signiﬁcant change from one round to the next.
T a b l e2e x p l o r e st h ee v o l u t i o no fa c t i o n sa n db e l i e f s .W eu s et h eW i l c o x o n
test to check diﬀerences between ct and ct−1 (gt and gt−1).
There is a signiﬁcant decline in contributions between periods 3 and 4
5We check whether ct and gt are drawn from the same population using paired non—
parametric test. The Wilcoxon test compares ct and gt for each round. Z1=—0.50 (p −
value =0 .61); Z2=-0.11 (0.91); Z3 =-0.28 (0.77); Z4=-3.83 (0.00)a n dZ5=-2,96 (0.00).
Sign tests yield identical results.
10(see also Figure 2) but this trend does not continue to period ﬁve. We do
not see a similar declining pattern for beliefs.
Table 2: Evolution of ct and gt.
Z p − value Z p − value
c1,c2 -0.02 0.98 g1,g2 -0.25 0.80
c2,c3 -0.19 0.84 g2,g3 -1.30 0.19
c3,c4 -2.34∗ 0.01 g3,g4 -0.15 0.88
c4,c5 -0.52 0.60 g4,g5 -1.69 0.09
Observe that whereas subjects change their behavior in period 4, this
change was not incorporated into posterior belief and subjects overstated
the value of the participants’ contribution at the end of the game. We may
conclude that, concerning average behavior:
Result 1.- T h e r ei sa ne n d — g a m ee ﬀe c ta tp e r i o dT − 1. Players do not
predict end-game eﬀects.
•
Result 1 refers to average behavior. However, diﬀerent types of players
may follow diﬀerent patterns.6 We address this issue in the next section.
6Previous work on PGG has shown evidence of subjects’ heterogeneity. For instance,
114 Individual results
Figure 2 showed the extent of the end-game phenomenon in aggregate be-
liefs and contributions. To explore the question more deeply, we analyze
individual behavior and beliefs.
In Table 3 we summarize actions and elicited beliefs of all subjects in
terms of the period in which they lowered contributions and the period in
which they believed the end game phenomenon would occur.
A decrease in contributions (in rows) is deﬁned here as lowering the con-
tribution to a value (i)l o w e rt h a n2
3 of the previous value and (ii) lower than
2
3 of the average of the own contribution in previous periods, provided the
decrease is maintained up to the last period.7
Note that 25% (12 out of 48) of subjects decrease their contribution in
period 4, but also a high percentage of subjects (23%) did not decrease their
contribution as the end of the game approached.
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit (2006) have found that some
players are conditional cooperators and others are free-riders.
7The actual decrease in the average contribution in period 4 was from (39.3; 35,4;a n d
31.4) to (18.4; 17.9)w h i c hf u l ﬁlls this criterion. Small changes in the threshold do not
change results (choosing 0.6 or 0.7 leaves results almost unchanged).
12Table 3: Actions (∇) & Predicted End Game Effects (EG)
∇2
3 EG at T-3 EG at T-2 EG at T-1 EG at T No EG total
∇ at T − 3 130 3 5 12
∇ at T − 2 020 1 4 7
∇ at T − 1 121 3 5 12
∇at T 100 1 4 6
No ∇ 200 2 7 11
t o t a l 571 10 25 48
Concerning beliefs (in columns): i) 25 out of 48 subjects (52%) did not
predict any end game eﬀect; ii) 10 subjects (21%) believed that the end
game eﬀect would occur at the last period and iii) the remaining subjects
(13) predicted the decline at T =4or before.8
This means that 73% of the players either predicted the decrease in con-
tributions later than the period in which the decrease took place (period 4)
or they did not predict it at all. This is remarkable since at the time of the
prediction they had already seen the outcome of the ﬁve periods of the con-
tribution game in their own group of four subjects (although the prediction
8Here we cannot distinguish between those subjects who expected ex ante a decrease
in contributions and those who learned about the end game eﬀect during the game.
13referred to the average of all participants). Subjects had the opportunity to
update their beliefs with the observed behavior in their group, in case they
have not predicted ex ante the end-game eﬀect.
Result 2.- Half of the subjects did not incorporate the observed end
game eﬀects into their posterior beliefs.
In the next section we try to rationalize this result by looking at how
posterior beliefs are formed.
5 Posterior Beliefs
The result of the previous section was that more than half of the subject pool
did not incorporate the observed end-game eﬀect in their own beliefs. Beliefs
were elicited after playing the PGG so that they must be a combination of ex-
ante beliefs (priors) and the signals observed throughout the game. Subjects
do not observe other players contributions, but they do observe the part of
the payoﬀ that comes from their group contributions to the public account.
We deﬁne this value as the signal9 observed by individual i in group z at






9An alternative signal could be the subjects’ payoﬀs (private + public account). We
also used this variable as the signal (see footnote 11).
14We model ex-post beliefs as a linear combination of prior beliefs and the
signal observed in the game for each individual i:
git =( 1− α)pit + αsit,
where prior beliefs of individual i, pit, might vary across periods.
S i n c ew eo b s e r v esit and git we can get an estimation of α. The assumption
is that the weight given to the signal and that given to the priors are the










+αsit + eit [1]
(1 − α)pit
where γo is the constant, γi are individual ﬁxed eﬀects (reﬂecting subjects’
heterogeneity), dt are period dummies allowing priors to be diﬀerent across
periods, the estimated parameters b βt will be an indication of how individuals
predict the end game eﬀect (if they do, parameters b β4 and b β5 will be negative
and signiﬁcant), and eit is the error term.
Table 4 shows the regression results.
15Table 4: Regression Results. Beliefs git
beliefs (git)( 1 ) ( 2 )
signal (sit) 0.11∗ (0.04) 0.14∗ (0.03)





R2 =0 .09 n =2 4 0 R2 =0 .07 n =2 4 0
F =4 .15 p − val. =0 .00 F =1 4 .98 p − val. =0 .00
(*) signiﬁcant at 1%; (std. errors).
The period dummies are not signiﬁcant. The implication is that when
we separate the eﬀect of the priors and that of the signal, priors are not
time dependent, i.e., on average subjects did not predict ex ante a decline in
contributions over time. Eliminating the time dummies from the regression
yields the coeﬃcients shown on the right of Table 4, regression (2).
The estimated weight of the signal, b α,i s14% but the weight of the priors,
1 − b α,i ss i xt i m e sl a r g e r .
16In regression (2) we may obtain a measure of each individual prior beliefs
weighted by (1 − α) through the predicted constant and ﬁxed eﬀects: b γo +
b γi (see equation [1] ). We calculate the main statistics for the (predicted)
prior beliefs: the mean (std. dev.) is 25.97 (14.47) and the max (min) is
69.3 (−0.8).10 Therefore, we observe a large heterogeneity in priors across
subjects.
Summing up our results in this section,
Result 3
• Priors are constant across periods, that is, subjects did not predict ex
ante any end game eﬀects. There is a large heterogeneity in priors.
• In the formation of posterior beliefs, the weight given to the signal (b α)
is relatively low: 10% − 15%. Priors are given a much larger weight.
To check the robustness of this result, we consider two alternative signals
that the subject could use to update his priors: the own contributions or
the payoﬀ h er e c e i v e di ne a c hp e r i o d .H o w e v e r ,t h e s es i g n a l st u r no u tt ob e
not signiﬁcant.11 In sum, to form their posterior beliefs subjects do not use
10The unweighted values are 30.20 and 80.58, respectively.
11Using the individual payoﬀsa ss i g n a l sy i e l d sac o e ﬃcient 0.02 (p − value 0.61); for
17their own contribution or the payoﬀ as signals but the average contribution
of their group.
The low weight given to the signal is consistent with the fact that although
individuals experienced an end game eﬀect, they did not guess it after the
game. Other papers have found evidence in the same direction: subjects
update their beliefs but very little (see Kovarik, 2008). Given the low weight
given to signals we should not expect large learning eﬀects from repetitions
of a ﬁnite PGG.12
6 Discussion
In the PGG repetition of the one-shot game has been shown to decrease
contributions. Repetition introduces learning eﬀects, strategic considerations
and the possibility of punishment for the unfair behavior of others13 that
could be related to the decrease in contributions.
We contribute to this literature on experimental public good games with
individual contributions the coeﬃcient is 0.04 (p − value 0.25). Adding subjects’ contri-
butions or payoﬀs in regressions (1) and (2) does not change results substantively in terms
of the estimated coeﬃcient of sit.
12This is also consistent with the low speed of learning observed in the centipede game
(see Palacios and Volij, 2008).
13See Andreoni (1995) and Houser and Kurzban (2002).
18the idea that the subjects’ diﬀerent abilities to unravel the game (or their
beliefs on the ability of others to do so) may be an important factor behind
the experimental results.
W ep e r f o r m e dt h i sa n a l y s i sa s k i n gs u b j e c t st h e i rb e l i e f so na v e r a g ec o n -
tributions for each period. The belief elicitation was placed after the PGG
to avoid any interference with contributions..
Our regression analysis let us measure the relative importance of priors
and signals on subjects’ belief formation. Our main results are that priors
are constant for all periods and they are given a large weight compared to
the signals observed throughout the game.
Our analysis suggest that before playing the game subjects do not expect
backward induction, not even in the last few periods, and their updating
with the observed signals is slow. Therefore, the posteriors beliefs do not
incorporate the end-game eﬀect.
Previous papers have studied the reasons behind contributions: kindness,
altruism or warm-glow vs. errors or confusion (see Croson, forthcoming; An-
dreoni 1995; Houser and Kurzban, 2002, among others). Our paper focuses
on a diﬀerent sort of confusion: people do not expect others to apply back-
ward induction. However, this confusion is not inconsistent with individuals
19endowed with other-regarding preferences and, more precisely, with subjects
who consider that other players could have social preferences.
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